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ABSTRACT: Labour taxes and subsidies, collective wage bargaining, and 
employment protection legislation affect labour market outcomes in 
Europe more strongly than in other advanced countries. This article 
outlines theoretical approaches to their motivation and consequences and 
reviews empirical insights from comparative cross-country studies of 
how employment, unemployment, and wage dynamics are shaped by the 
interaction between institutions, macroeconomic developments, and 
structural features. 
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European Labour Markets 
 
European labour markets, especially those of Continental countries, are characterized by 
more unionized wage setting and more stringent regulation of employment 
relationships than those of other OECD countries. Within that group of advanced 
countries, their unemployment rates used to be relatively low, and became very high. 
Around 1970, the unemployment rate was approximately 3.1% in the OECD aggregate 
and 5% in the US, but the unemployment rate hardly exceeded 4% in any European 
country. In the aggregate of 11 core European Union countries that later adopted the 
euro at its inception, unemployment was only 2.2% in 1970. It then rose rapidly, 
exceeding 10% in 1984 and hovering around 12% in the second half of the 1990s, while 
both the US and the OECD aggregate unemployment rates fluctuated in the 4-9% range.  
The wide variety of labour market developments over the last quarter of the twentieth 
century has motivated extensive modelling efforts and comparative empirical studies of 
institutional features’ motivation and effects. This article reviews the roles of 
institutions, shocks, and structural change in shaping aggregate and disaggregate labour 
market outcomes.  
To illustrate the spirit of more general approaches to the relevant issues, it is useful to 
focus initially on the simplest models and the best understood labour market institutions 
(Prescott, 2004). Consider inverse demand and supply functions 
 wd =a(l ), ws =s(l ),                                               (1) 
where l denotes log employment and ws and wd denote log wage rates. The wage w* and 
employment l* that equate supply and demand satisfy the condition 
s(l*)=a(l*)=w*                                                          (2) 
in static competitive equilibrium. As the simplest example of how institutions can 
change this outcome, consider a labour income tax that, inserting a wedge τ between 
employers’ labour costs and workers’ take home pay, changes the equilibrium condition 
to  
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s( l )=a( l ) – τ                                                         (3) 
and lowers employment by about 
l – l* ≈ – τ/(η+ε)                                                       (4) 
where s’(l )= ε > 0 and a’(l )= – η, 0<η<1. It is also simple to characterize formally the 
effects of binding legal or contractual minimum wage levels. If the wage is w > w*, the 
employment levels corresponding to w on the supply and demand curves are defined by 
s(L) = w and a( l ) = w, and differ by the number 
L – l ≈ ( w – w* )(ε+η)/(εη)                                              (5) 
of unemployed workers, who would be willing to work at the going wage but cannot 
obtain employment.  
From this simple perspective it is obvious that differences in taxation and wage floors 
may explain cross-country differences in employment and unemployment. Qualitatively 
similar insights can be derived in the context of more complex and realistic models of 
unemployment, and can be applied to other institutions. When unemployment is due to 
matching frictions, efficiency wages, and other imperfect allocation mechanisms, taxes 
and wage rigidities can affect search efforts and equilibrium employment and 
unemployment, which are affected in turn by the market’s structure (such as the extent 
of mismatch between workers’ qualifications and vacancies) and by other institutional 
features (such as the scope and efficiency of employment agencies). In both competitive 
and frictional models of the labour market, benefits paid to out-of-work individuals can 
affect labour supply and search effort, and there can be similar effects from less visible 
policy aspects, such as the availability of public-sector employment opportunities at 
favourable wage/effort ratios (Algan, Cahuc, and Zylberberg, 2002).  
At the same time as it offers obvious explanations for labour market outcomes, 
institutional variation raises the less obvious issues of why institutions should be as 
different across countries as they are observed to be, and of how their configuration and 
impact may depend on structural labour market features.  
The relevance of distributional issues and of market imperfections can explain some of 
labour market institutions’ heterogeneity. The equilibrium condition (1) efficiently 
equates employed labour’s marginal productivity to its non-employment opportunity 
cost, and distorting this outcome reduces the welfare of a perfectly competitive 
economy’s representative individual. If workers disregard non-labour income, however, 
their total surplus can be increased by trading lower employment off higher pay along 
downward-sloping labour demand curves such as (2). It is maximized when the wage 
exceeds the marginal opportunity cost of employment by a monopolistic mark-up factor, 
and employment is set at a level l such that   
a(l ) – s(l ) = log[1/(1–η)]≈η.                                             (6) 
All workers’ welfare can be increased if the higher wages earned by those who are 
employed more than compensate for the labour income lost by those who would be 
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employed at the competitive wage. Such compensation may take place within families, 
or over individual lifetimes, and can also be explicit if the revenue raised by 
employment taxes is spent subsidizing non-employed individuals.  
Institutions that decrease employment and increase labour costs can be rationalized 
recognizing that they affect not only the amount of production but also its distribution 
across heterogeneous individuals, and that markets (especially financial markets) are not 
perfect in real-life economies. Higher wages and lower employment can benefit workers 
who have negligible non-labour income, and households’ limited access to formal 
financial markets can rationalize collectively administered risk-sharing schemes (Agell, 
2002). In European countries, legislation meant to endow workers with some bargaining 
power and to insure them against health, unemployment, and old-age hazards was 
introduced at times of actual or feared social unrest, in Bismarck’s industrializing 
Germany or in Lord Beveridge’s post-War United Kingdom. In principle, it can be 
efficient to try and provide insurance through mandatory government schemes when 
information and legal enforcement problems make it difficult for private markets to do 
so. But public schemes are not immune from such problems, and tend to reduce 
employment as, for example, recipients of unemployment subsidies reduce work effort. 
Such efficiency losses are more easily affordable by richer societies, and Europe’s fast 
and stable post-War growth was unsurprisingly accompanied by development of 
increasingly extensive legislation and co-decision powers by unions. By the early 1970s, 
the institutional structure of labour markets was distinctively different not only across 
the US and Europe as a whole, but also across countries within Europe, where labour 
market policies play different roles in different Welfare State models (Bertola et al., 
2001). In Nordic countries, a tradition of full employment and universal welfare is based 
on generous unemployment benefits and a very important role for active labour market 
policies (including job creation in the public sector). The Bismarckian model of 
continental countries such as France and Germany features centralized wage 
determination and stringent employment protection legislation, and contributory 
pension, health, and unemployment insurance programs. The Beveridgian model of the 
United Kingdom and other Anglo-Saxon countries features social assistance safety 
financed by general taxation and comparatively light regulation of wage determination 
and employment relationships.  
Even though relief from the need to work should in general reduce employment, until 
the 1970s, and even in the aftermath of the late 1960s period of worker unrest, 
increasingly generous pro-worker institutions coexisted in Europe with low 
unemployment rates; much lower, in fact, than in the comparatively unregulated United 
States. The first oil shock and the following decades of slower growth saw the inception 
and persistence of high unemployment in most European countries, and increasing 
attention to the effect of institutions on labour market performance. If wages are pre-set, 
shocks can cause employment and unemployment fluctuations, the size and persistence 
of which depends on the extent of ex post wage flexibility and on the character of wage 
bargaining. Nominal shocks are a more relevant source of real wage misalignments and 
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unemployment in labour markets with more pervasive and longer-term collective wage 
contracts. Conversely, real wages react more promptly to productivity shocks or growth 
slowdowns if bargaining parties are in a better position to take into account their 
employment implications. Reactions to country-wide shocks are quicker, and such 
shocks’ unemployment consequences less severe, when wage bargaining is more 
centralized and better coordinated across industries (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).  
This can explain why unemployment began to increase, more or less sharply, when in 
the 1970s European countries were hit by oil shocks and other macroeconomic 
developments that reduced the amount of labour demanded at any given wage. 
Inflation and output dynamics subsequently appear to drive European unemployment 
fluctuations around a natural level that, after having raised sharply until the early 1980s, 
has remained essentially flat for some 20 years (Blanchard, 2006). The prolonged upward 
trend and the resilience of high unemployment levels naturally draw attention to non-
cyclical, structural aspects of labour market dynamics. Wage floors can prevent 
underbidding by the unemployed of equation (5), but it is difficult for that static 
relationship to explain why, in the absence of institutional changes that would further 
increase unions’ wage-setting power, unemployment remained high in the aftermath of 
the 1970s crises.  
A more suitable dynamic perspective is offered by models where labour demand shocks 
can permanently affect the link between wages and outside options, for example because 
job losers no longer have a say in wage determination, or because replacement of 
employed workers would entail large turnover costs (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). The 
persistence of employment and unemployment dynamics, however, is in fact influenced 
not only by limited wage-setting flexibility, but also by regulatory constraints on hiring 
and firing. In European countries, employment protection legislation (EPL) typically 
requires that termination of individual regular employment contracts be motivated and 
subject to court appeal, and that collective dismissals be conditional on administrative 
procedures involving formal negotiations with workers' organisations and with local or 
national authorities.  
Such provisions do have the intended effect of ‘protecting’ jobs at times of declining 
labour demand, when firing costs smooth out job losses and reduce downward wage 
pressure. Just because such a situation is costly for employers, however, it is optimal for 
them to refrain from hiring in upturns, so as to reduce the desirability of labour 
shedding in downturns. In terms of simple demand-and-supply relationships such as 
those introduced above, the marginal productivity of labour should be lower than the 
wage when employment is declining and firing a marginal worker entails firing costs as 
well as wage-cost savings, but it should symmetrically be higher than the wage when 
employment is increasing, and the marginal worker’s costs include expected future 
firing costs as well as the current wage. Thus, the implications of EPL are similar to those 
of labour taxes for expanding firms, and to those of employment subsidies for 
downsizing firms. If employment fluctuations are efficient in laissez faire, EPL obviously 
reduces production and profits. Unlike labour taxes, however, it does do not do so by 
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reducing employment on average (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990), because its contrasting 
effects on employers’ propensity to hire and fire reduce employment volatility but affect 
its average level ambiguously. Empirically, in fact, there is no convincing evidence of 
any relationship between EPL and employment or unemployment level. As discussed in 
some more detail below, correlations have to be treated with caution in this context, but 
more stringent EPL is associated with more stable aggregate employment paths and 
with longer unemployment durations within the pool of unemployed workers (Bertola, 
1999). There is also some evidence that EPL affects the demographic composition of 
employment and unemployment – as it should in theory, since it reduces job finding 
rates for young job market entrants and female workers with intermittent labour force 
participation at the same time as it reduces job-loss rates for mature workers.  
Another important related difference across labour markets pertains to the extent and 
character of wage inequality. Earnings are typically less dispersed in Europe than in 
other advanced countries. The extent of underlying heterogeneity in workers’ 
characteristics is an important determinant of earnings dispersion, but institutional 
wage-setting constraints also appear very relevant, both theoretically and empirically. 
While centralised bargaining may be better able to coordinate reactions to aggregate 
shocks, it tends to result in less detailed, more homogenous wage structures across 
firms, sectors, regions, individuals. Similar wages for heterogeneous workers imply 
divergence of employment outcomes, for example across demographic groups (Kahn, 
2000) and across regions in Italy, Germany, Spain, where the uniformity of centrally 
bargained wages (and of other national institutions) tends to lower employment where 
labour is less productive. Empirically, relative wage variation appears to be heavily 
constrained in the same countries where EPL is most stringent (Bertola and Rogerson, 
1995). This is unsurprising, because quantitative firing restrictions could hardly be 
binding if, in the face of negative labour demand shocks, wages could fall so as to make 
stable employment profitable, or to induce voluntary quits. Across countries, the 
combination of wage and quantity rigidities indeed appears to protect employed 
workers from labour income volatility, as individuals enjoy more stable wages and 
longer tenure lengths. 
At the aggregate level, the role of institution in shaping heterogeneous dynamics across 
labour markets is not as immediately apparent. Institutions vary widely across countries 
but, within each country, they are much more stable than unemployment, wage 
inequality and other labour market outcome variables. As discussed above, however, 
wage setting institutions can shape an economy’s reaction to aggregate shocks. More 
generally, the same dynamic developments can produce very different employment and 
wage outcomes in countries with different (albeit stable) institutions. This can explain 
why, in the 1970s and 1980s, countries with more extensively regulated labour markets 
experienced more pronounced unemployment increases in the aftermath of similar 
productivity, inflation, and wage shocks (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). Empirically, in 
fact, the forces that interact with labour market institutions in driving dynamic 
trajectories can be almost equally well represented by period-specific dummy variables 
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rather than by observable macroeconomic variables, which tend to behave rather 
similarly over time across industrialized countries. Thus, the evidence can be consistent 
with  a role for common structural trends rather than for country-specific shocks.  
For example, the relationship between country-specific labour market institutions and 
unemployment and wage dispersion dynamics, can be interpreted in the light of skill-
biased technological progress trends, or of increasing opportunities for advanced 
countries to import unskilled-labour-intensive goods and export skill-intensive ones. 
Over the last three decades of the twentieth century unemployment displayed a trend 
increase in Continental European countries but remained trend-less in the US and other 
Anglo-Saxon countries, while earnings inequality remained stable (or even declined) in 
the former group of countries but trended upward in the latter. If technological progress 
or international trade increase laissez faire wage inequality, they also increase the 
relevance of wage floors: if in European countries low wages cannot decline, 
employment of unskilled workers must decline (Krugman, 1994). Similar insights into 
the changing implications of unchanging institutions can be drawn considering other 
structural aspects. More intense product market competition, as implied by Europe’s 
economic integration process and by more general globalization trends, increases the 
elasticity of labour demand. In the context of the simple example above, a smaller η 
implies larger employment losses from any give tax wedge in eq.(4), and higher 
unemployment from any given wage floor in eq.(5). In more complex dynamic models, 
if reallocation towards higher-paying jobs is costly then institutions that tend to prevent 
wage inequality and restrict mobility have sharper implications for employment and 
unemployment when more volatile shocks affect labour demand (Ljungqvist and 
Sargent, 1998).  
Structural change can magnify the unemployment and employment effects of 
institutions meant to redistribute income and remedy financial market imperfection, or 
can make them redundant (for example, because financial market development makes 
labour income fluctuations less problematic). Then, institutions should be reformed. In 
the simple formal framework above, the same smaller η that amplifies the negative 
employment implications of given institutions also calls for a smaller mark-up in eq.(6). 
And, in reality, policy frameworks introduced in the 1990s, such as those recommended 
by the OECD Jobs Study and by the European Union’s Lisbon Strategy, deemphasize 
income support for job seekers and job losers in favour of job creation spurred by wage 
and employment flexibility, and the role of training and other active labour market 
policies aimed at bringing workers’ productivity in line with wage aspirations. 
Reforms are at least partly motivated by better theoretical and empirical understanding 
of labour market institutions’ effects. But while it is in principle obvious that 
institutional interference can be responsible for high unemployment and low 
employment, just because such effects depends on potentially heterogeneous structural 
parameters it is hard to assess their impact in data where many relevant confounding 
factors cannot be controlled. Simple correlation can be very misleading. For example, a 
negative cross-country correlation between EPL and employment rates is fully 
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accounted for by low female employment-population ratios in Southern Europe (Nickell, 
1997), while effects on prime-age male employment rates tend to be positive. Both 
policies and outcomes can jointly respond to underlying cultural differences in this and 
other cases, and it is difficult to obtain reliable estimates from cross-sectional 
relationships between institutions and outcomes (Baker et al, 2005). More articulate and 
robust insights may be obtained from specifications where time-series variation and 
interactions play important roles (Bassanini and Duval, 2006). As the time dimension of 
available data increases, however, it will be increasingly important when interpreting 
time-series evidence to focus on the economics and politics of reform processes rather 
than of institutions at each point in time (Saint Paul, 2000), and to be aware of plausible 
channels of institutional endogeneity. If shocks or structural changes that make job loss 
more or less likely or painful trigger changes in the generosity of unemployment 
insurance or in the stringency of employment protection legislation, for example, the 
correlation between such institutions and employment performances may be largely 
spurious. The wide and changing variety of labour market policies across countries 
offers opportunities to try and disentangle their effects in increasingly available 
disaggregated data, at the same time as it makes it necessary to take into account the 
many important and related respects, besides labour market structure, in which 
countries differ.  
 
       Giuseppe Bertola 
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